In February 2022 Russian tanks and troops crossed into Ukraine from Belarusian territory: they used Belarusian roads, Belarusian airfields, Belarusian fuel, and Belarusian political cover. That offensive collapsed. The fiction of neutrality was never abandoned. It was refined. The troops stayed. The bases remained. The factories kept working. The hospitals treated the wounded. The regime continued collecting the rewards of dependence.
2022 and subsequent modernisation
Russian forces are still operating from Belarusian territory. Approximately 2,200 Russian military personnel remain present. Airfields that launched strikes on Ukraine in 2022 have been systematically upgraded. Luninets, more than 50 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, is one of the clearest examples. In February 2022 it hosted more than two dozen Russian Su-25 attack aircrafts, Su-34 bombers, and helicopters that struck Ukrainian targets in the first days of the full-scale invasion. After most of that aviation withdrew, Belarus carried out one of the most extensive modernizations of any of its military airfields.
Satellite images from 2022–2025 show renovated barracks, upgraded and newly built hangars, expanded fuel storage, fortifications, multiple air-defense and missile systems. In 2023 the airfield became the permanent base of Belarus’s 56th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment. It is equipped primarily with S-300PS systems. Luninets continues to support dispersed helicopter alert duties, including night interception missions against drones. Similar upgrades (like new hangars, runway repairs, radar improvements and fortifications) took place at Zyabrovka, Lida, Baranovichi and Machulishchi. All of them had hosted Russian aviation in 2022.
The Oreshnik intermediate range system were installed near Krichev Airbase in summer 2026. The 1405th Artillery Ammunition Base near Bolshaya Gorozha (Osipovichi district) received a new vehicle depot. It was sized for a battalion level unit, complete with repair facilities and barracks. Specialised railway complexes capable of receiving and unloading full military trains of 60 wagons or more were built at former airbase sites (including the one near Krichev). Additional rail infrastructure is under construction roughly 40 kilometres from the Ukrainian border in the Gomel region. These facilities allow equipment and ammunition to be delivered while bypassing public stations.
More than 500 Belarusian enterprises are now involved in Russian defence orders. The Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) supplies chassis that are critical to Iskander, S-400 and other systems. Ukrainian military intelligence estimates Russian dependence on Belarusian wheeled chassis at up to 90% in certain categories. Optical and targeting systems produced in Belarus cover up to 85% of corresponding Russian needs. A new full cycle ammunition facility near Slutsk is designed for continuous three shift production of up to 180,000 (152 mm) artillery shells and 270,000 (122 mm) rockets per year. It is scheduled to begin operations at the end of 2026. It is partially financed and technologically supported by Russia.
Personnel presence
As of September–October 2026, approximately 2,200 Russian military personnel remain in Belarus. Belarusian forces in the southern sector near the Ukrainian border number roughly 1,250. Signal repeaters on Belarusian territory continue to guide Russian attack drones. Nearly a thousand wounded Russian soldiers were treated in hospitals in the Gomel region. They include personnel from units later linked to the Bucha and Hostomel killings. Hundreds of Belarusian citizens have signed contracts to fight for Russia.
The official language from Minsk remains carefully empty: “exercises,” “defensive measures,” “forced alliance.” The regime continues to benefit while insisting it is merely surviving. Western governments have imposed sanctions but they have not imposed clarity. Calling Belarus “neutral” or “coerced” is a form of convenience meant to avoid the harder conclusion: a European state was chosen to function as an instrument of another state’s war.

Forward analysis
The infrastructure now in place reduces the time required for Russia to generate a credible threat from the north. A future decision to reinforce the grouping would not require the construction of basic facilities. It would require only the movement of personnel and equipment onto already prepared platforms. The specialised rail complexes and ammunition production capacity mean that sustainment of any renewed northern pressure would be less dependent on vulnerable Russian territory.
Significant Ukrainian units must remain tied to the northern border regardless of the intensity of fighting in the east or south. Every month that this infrastructure remains operational is a month in which Ukrainian resources are diverted from the main theatre.
The same infrastructure is located on NATO’s eastern flank: next to the borders of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and along the approaches to the Suwałki corridor. The presence of modernised airfields, air defence systems and potential intermediate range missile deployments changes the military geography of the region.
The most probable trajectory for the nearest future is continued expansion rather than sudden escalation: further hardening of airfields, growth of ammunition output, additional specialised logistics, sustained electronic support for Russian strikes. A rapid offensive from Belarus remains possible.
Conclusion
Lukashenko still speaks of sovereignty. The reality is didderent: a country that rents its territory, its industry, its railways, and its silence to an aggressor is not sovereign. It is useful. And usefulness which was once accepted and expanded into concrete military infrastructure, becomes a form of participation that no amount of careful language can erase.
References
- BELPOL & Community of Railway Workers of Belarus – The Militarization of Belarus (October 2026)
https://belzhd.info/en/reports/joint-analytical-report-with-belpol-the-militarization-of-belarus/
PDF: https://belzhd.info/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/belpol-report-militarization-of-belarus-2026-en.pdf - SpaceKnow – Long-term monitoring of Russian activities on the Luninets Airbase
https://spaceknow.com/blog/long-term-monitoring-of-russian-activities-on-the-luninets-airbase/ - iSANS – Review of Military Activity in Belarus – September 2026
https://isans.org/military/review-of-military-activity-in-belarus-%e2%80%93-september-2026.html - OCCRP / Belarusian Investigative Center – Belarus Ramps Up Arms Pipeline to Russia Amid Sanctions Gaps
https://www.occrp.org/en/news/belarus-ramps-up-arms-pipeline-to-russia-amid-sanctions-gaps - RFE/RL (Skhemy / Radio Svoboda) – Satellite imagery of Krichev-6 / Oreshnik-related construction and airfield upgrades
(multiple reports, e.g. coverage of Planet Labs imagery of Krichev-6 and Luninets modernisation, 2025–2026) - Ukrainian military intelligence assessments on Russian dependence on Belarusian MZKT chassis (up to 90%) and optical systems (up to 85%) – cited in OCCRP/BIC reporting and open Ukrainian sources.
- Militarnyi / Euromaidan Press / Ukrinform / Kyiv Post – reporting on Russian personnel levels (~2,200), drone signal repeaters, hospital treatment of wounded Russian soldiers, and rail infrastructure (2025–2026).
- Official statements of the Ministry of Defence of Belarus regarding the 56th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment at Luninets.





























